

HEGEL AND THE ONTOLOGICAL PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

The theme of the proofs of God's existence appears frequently in Hegelian thought. But Hegel's position regarding these proofs is difficult to pin down, since he seems neither entirely in approval of them, nor ready to condemn them outright. Moreover, it is difficult to appreciate where exactly this theme fits into the encyclopaedic structure. For Hegel, does the discussion of these proofs fall under logic, religion or philosophy – or perhaps even elsewhere, unless this would volatilise the very idea of the encyclopaedic structure? To these basic worries a circumstantial factor is added: the primary text on the proofs, i.e. the sixteen *Lectures on Proofs of the Existence of God* (1829), is incomplete, and end with the examination of the cosmological argument. This makes it difficult to understand the complete meaning of the project. Numerous questions present themselves. Are the proofs as historically presented valid or invalid for Hegel? Furthermore, does he propose an alternative proof to those traditionally recognised? Or does he deny that any proof of God's existence is possible, or even meaningful? Besides, what does it mean to prove something, and in what terms is the question of God's existence to be asked, strictly speaking? We must eventually find out what interest and degrees of validity the proofs of God's existence hold for Hegel, how well founded he thinks they are, and in what sense they might possibly be surpassed. The hypothesis defended will be this: for the author of the *Encyclopaedia*, the traditional proofs are to be criticised because they do not constitute a self-demonstration, but rather a demonstration brought about by an “abstractly subjective” thinker, one who stands separately from his object of investigation. But for all that, God, understood as the spirit that manifests its infinity on a religious mode, exists – or rather comes to give himself an adequate existence in opposition to his inadequate forms of existence. The proofs of God's existence express, in the diversity of their formulations, the possible modes of the relation that God maintains with the *Dasein*, i.e. with given reality. In particular, in the case of the ontological argument, there is cause to draw a distinction between the “Anselmian” proof, which *presupposes* the unity of God and of the *Dasein*, the “Kantian” proof, which *negates* this unity, and finally the strictly “Hegelian” proof, which *establishes* this unity *in opposition to a prior separation*, and which thus gives itself genuine legitimacy.

I. Does existence prove itself?

Before embarking on a more specific analysis of proofs of God's existence, it is necessary to reflect on the Hegelian apprehension of questions of *proof* and of *proof of existence* in general. Does the existence of that which exists merit, or require, proof?

To answer this question, let us consider the analysis Hegel has in store for objects or for determinations, whose existence has been traditionally considered problematic up to and including the post-Kantians: for example the exterior world, the internal finality of living beings, and the free will of the spiritual subject. It will be of interest, then, to remark that for Hegel there does not seem to be any need at all to prove the existence of such objects, the truth of this existence seeming quite obvious to him. The task of philosophy for Hegel appears to be to grasp the *systematic significance* of objects under consideration, but not to determine *whether they exist* in actual fact or, contrary to this, have a merely illusory existence. Hegel, at least at first glance, seems freed from any sceptical doubt and, correspondingly, from the need to provide any proof of the existence of the objects he is examining. Does this mean that he trusts the objects traditionally studied by philosophy, and is naïve to the point of never suspecting the doubtful character of certain among them? We may answer this question may in two parts.

a) Hegel certainly acknowledges the reality of the objects of philosophical inquiry, but this is because he precisely determines their status. For example, if we take a look at the well-known text of §6 of the Introduction to the *Encyclopaedia*, we see that for him the object of philosophy is “actuality” (*Wirklichkeit*), in the sense of that which is “originally produced and producing itself [...] [and] has

become the world [...] of consciousness.”¹ According to this complex definition, which does not presently require an overly detailed analysis, actuality, here as the object of philosophy, supposes, independently of any intervention from the subject, an activity of generation and self-generation, and a self-presentation to consciousness. It is not the knowing subject that makes it appear, since it produces itself and reveals itself spontaneously to him. Certainly, philosophical thought could not be content to passively describe that which is given in this way, and must universalise its object in such a way as to organise it systematically, and thus “scientifically”. Nevertheless, for Hegel the object of philosophy manifests itself just as it produces itself. Given that it is not a construct of consciousness but something that presents itself in person, it would be preposterous to doubt its existence.

With this in mind, one of the motivations for a proof of existence disappears completely. Having admitted, for example, that nature is not only that which one perceives sensibly, but moreover, the production process of sensible beings, it would then be vain to demonstrate that nature exists. In the same way, it would be pointless to demonstrate the existence of other people, since another subject for me is just an individual forming its spiritual self in its relation to me, and faced with whom I in turn form my own spiritual self. Experience, in the Hegelian sense, removes any sense of doubt concerning existence, in that it is experience of self-production. A thing inextricably posits itself in its being and its appearance – which renders unnecessary any doubt regarding the reliability of the experience in which it presents itself.

b) At the same time, however, the existence of anything is inevitably problematic. As we know, being is not a glorious, shining accomplishment for Hegel. Rather, that which is, is constantly evolving and is characterised by moments of abstraction, that is, of closing upon itself and contradiction – that is, of division into opposing principles. For example, a spirit is never entirely developed at the outset, and will inevitably experience phases of internal and external conflict. To take another example: can one say that Hegelian nature “exists” in the strongest sense of the term? The reply is, of course, a resounding negative, since nature presses unceasingly upon the transience of its components. This is why it has a merely “phenomenal” existence²: and not in the Kantian sense where nature such as it appears would be distinct from that which it is in itself, but in the sense that it lacks any unifying internal reason. As such, we need to consider both sides of the issue. The object of philosophical knowledge presents itself just as it is and, in that respect, has no need to be ‘proved’ in an argumentative discourse. At the same time, however, its existence is not univocal but is part of a turbulent process, in accordance with which it must pass through opposing phases and will only reach completion *in fine*. While for Descartes, for example, a goal for philosophy is to reach an indubitable certainty in response to a possible sceptical objection, the real philosophical issue for Hegel is the grasping of the process by which the subject in question – the Idea or the absolute – posits and reveals itself as a true being in opposition to its inadequate moments. Having fleshed out the hypothesis that subjective demonstrative discourse is rendered obsolete by the activity of the Idea, let us consider the way in which Hegel explicitly comments on this discourse. It will be observed that he contrasts “reflective” proof with the “dialectical” – i.e. “speculative” – movement of discourse. Let us consider two well-known extracts from the preface to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*:

This movement which constitutes what formerly the proof was supposed to accomplish, is the dialectical movement of the proposition itself. This alone is the speculative in act, and only the expression of this movement is a speculative exposition.

This is like what happens in ordinary proof, where the reasons given are themselves in need of further reasons, and so on ad infinitum. This pattern of giving reasons and stating conditions belongs to that method of proof which differs from the dialectical movement, and belongs therefore to external cognition.³

From Hegel's point of view, in speculative discourse the concept is self-justifying, whereas in the case of reflective proof it is the thinker who organises the demonstration from without. Speculative discourse is autonomous and inwardly necessary, while the discourse of proof is dependant upon exterior conditions,

¹ G.W.F. Hegel: *Enzyklopädie* I, § 6, in *Theorie-Werkausgabe*. Auf der Grundlage der Werke von 1832–1845 neu edierte Ausgabe. Redaktion Eva Moldenhauer und Karl Markus Michel. Frankfurt a. M. 1970 [in the following: *TWA*] 8, 47. *The Logic of Hegel* [in the following: *L*], transl. by W. Wallace, London 1959. 9.

² See: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: *Vorlesung über Naturphilosophie, Berlin 1823/24*. Nachgeschrieben von K.G.J. von Griesheim. Herausgegeben von Gilles Marmasse, Frankfurt a. M. 2000. 88: “Nature is a form of otherness, it is a posited being, a being which is nothing but a phenomenon”.

³ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: *Phenomenology of Spirit*, *TWA* 3, 61, transl. by Arnold V. Miller, Oxford 1977. 40-41.

and thus contingent. In speculative discourse – for example in the *Phenomenology* or the *Encyclopaedia* – we are not concerned with arguments provided by the philosopher, but instead contemplate the living Idea which unfurls before us and establishes its own validity. Conversely, in the discourse of proof the thinker establishes a connection between premises and conclusion for himself, elements which are themselves indifferent to the reasoning established. The “ordinary”, “reflective” proof is not the spontaneous development of the thing itself but a subjective construction.⁴ Furthermore, because it is not inwardly mediated, it lacks sufficient reason: this is why it is doomed to a movement of infinite regression.

Further to the question of the degree of validity of the proof, however, is the question of its function. For Hegel neither the reflective proof nor the speculative discourse aims to show the reality of an existence in opposition to a possible sceptical doubt. But, speculative discourse, as well as reflective proof, strives towards the establishment of a relation of necessity between the different moments of a process. According to the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*: “The demonstration has the aim of showing us the coherence between the two determinations [God and Being]”.⁵ And according to the *Logic* of 1831: “Proof presents necessity”.⁶

However, we know that necessity presents multiple meanings for Hegel. So it is that, in the case of the reflective proof of the existence of God, the thinker only succeeds in establishing an 'exterior' necessity: The proof does not express the living existence of God as it expresses itself, but only a subjective inference which relies upon terms which are foreign to one another⁷– and this, as we shall see, includes the case of the strictly “Hegelian” formulation of the proof. A three-point summary may be drawn up: a) The reflective proof and speculative proposition both establish a certain tie of necessity between the constitutive moments of a process. b) The discourse of the reflective proof only reveals a *relative* necessity, however, because it is linked to the contingent aims of the subjective thinker, while the speculative proposition reveals an *absolute* necessity because it is linked to a self-manifestation. c) Nevertheless, reflective proof is not invalid for Hegel. For example, he is far from taking mathematical reasoning, which he does indeed subject to copious critique, to be erroneous or fallacious. Simply put, he does not recognise it as having the value of a free discourse, which would be true in the strongest sense of the term. As such, we might already suspect that he will go on to consider proofs of God's existence just as pertinent as critiques of them, in cases where those critiques are demonstrative themselves – but that he will deny that either of them possesses the dignity of speculative, entirely self-founded discourse.

II. How might God exist?

Does God exist for Hegel? Answering this question is not simple, as his work fails to yield any sentences of the form: “Having considered the evidence, I conclude that God exists”; or, indeed: “Having considered the evidence, I conclude that God does not exist”. We never find this kind of expression precisely because, as far as Hegel is concerned, it is not up to the subjective thinker to draw conclusions: it is up to the thing itself to make itself manifest and actual. However, there is certainly a discourse on the divine to be found here. Two significant usages of the notion can be discerned: a general usage, in which God is synonymous with the Idea, that is, with the constantly evolving concrete totality; and a more specific usage, in which God is synonymous with the religious manifestation of the spiritual Idea. It is, for example, in accordance with the first usage, where God is the equivalent of the absolute in general, that Hegel affirms that the content of logic is “the presentation of God such as he is in his eternal essence”.⁸ It is in this respect once again that an addition to the *Philosophy of Spirit* declares that “like the spirit, exterior nature is also rational, *divine*”.⁹ “God” is here the “representative” label of the interior, active and unitary foundation in all finite reality. However, there is also a specifically religious

⁴ See: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: *Vorlesungen über die Beweise des Daseins Gottes* [in the following: *BDG*], *TWA* 17, 358-359. *Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God* [in the following: *LPEG*], transl. by Peter C. Hodgson, Oxford 2007. 46.

⁵ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion* [in the following: *VPR*]. Herausgegeben von Walter Jaeschke. In: *G.W.F. Hegel: Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte*. Bände 3-5. Hamburg 1983-1984. 1, 310. *Lectures on the Philosophy of religion* [in the following: *LPR*], transl. by Robert F. Brown, Peter C. Hodgson and J. Michael Stewart. Berkeley 1984-1985. 1, 417.

⁶ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: *Vorlesungen über die Logik* (1831). Nachgeschrieben von K. Hegel. Herausgegeben von Udo Rameil und Hans Christian Lucas. In: *G.W.F. Hegel: Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte*. Band 10. Hamburg 2001. 220.

⁷ See: *E I*, § 232, *TWA* 8, 325. *L.* 370-371.

⁸ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: *Science of Logic*, *TWA* 5, 44.

⁹ *E III*, *TWA* 10, 18. *Philosophy of Mind* [PM], trans. by William Wallace, Arnold V. Miller and Michael J. Inwood, Oxford 2007. 10.

usage of the notion of divinity in Hegel's philosophy. We should ask, then: does the God of religion exist for him, and if so, how?

The God of religion is the spirit that manifests its absoluteness in a representative manner. This merits a little clarification. a) Hegel's God is nothing other than the spirit that manifests itself in religion.¹⁰ The mistake, from a Hegelian point of view, would be to dissociate God from his manifestation, as if the latter were only the more or less contingent reflection of the former. This position is, in a certain respect, that held in traditional theology, where the very essence of God remains impenetrable for us as do many aspects of his actions: for this theology, manifestation is merely one among God's many activities, an activity by which he tells us only what he wants to tell us about himself. In contrast, God for Hegel, like spirit, is only defined by the activeness of his knowledge and the exercising of his will – an activeness which is essentially manifest, since “the determinacy of spirit is manifestation”.¹¹ b) More specifically, in religion spirit manifests itself as absolute, that is, as surpassing the limits of subjective spirit (i.e. of spirit reduced to its individual inwardness) and of objective spirit (i.e. of spirit spread throughout the world without any real principle of unity). For Hegel, the God of religion manifests himself as reconciled with the world, i.e. as its unifying principle of determination, the principle that sublates all finitude within it.¹² c) At the same time, however, spirit is *only* manifest here in a religious manner, which is to say, in a way which is both interior and representational, and thus is neither aesthetic (solely exterior) nor philosophical (pertaining to systematically organised thought). The religious moment is a matter of internal conviction, but its moments are merely juxtaposed or associated in a sensible manner, and are not rationally unified.¹³

In short, to understand what God is in religion according to Hegel, we will need to move away from the idea that religion is a creation of individuals or of peoples – that it is a product of finite spirit, whether subjective or objective. Rather, religion brings about the sublation – the ideal undertaking through knowledge and will – of subjective spirit and objective spirit, which are then presupposed. In this particular case, we return to a persistent trait of spirit as Hegel describes it, namely that it brings itself into existence *spontaneously* and by virtue of *interior reason*, *in opposition to* its preceding moments. In his conception of the divine spirit, Hegel shows himself to be at once in agreement and disagreement with Christian theology: a) In opposition to the Christian tradition, he does not conceive of God as exterior to the world, nor as a first reality. For him God belongs to the common world of spirit, and simply constitutes a moment in its becoming. b) However, in opposition this time to anti-religious tradition, he thinks (as is the case for every moment of the spirit) that the religious spirit is not reducible to the moments that preceded it, in so far as it brings itself into existence by freeing itself from their finitude. It is thus important, once again, to consider both sides of the issue. In contrast with traditional theology, religion for Hegel is not simply the reflection of a God who would exist independently of belief: for God is nothing outside of religion, he is simply the spirit that manifests itself in a religious way.¹⁴ But then in contrast with atheism, God, or the religious spirit, has a *sui generis* existence for Hegel which, far from being reducible to the imaginative activity of individuals, is instead a representation that overcomes all finite representation. The divine, for Hegel, is not a first cause. Nevertheless, like all moments, it constitutes a new starting point which sublates its conditions: “Religion is a begetting of the divine spirit, not an invention of human beings but an effect of the divine at work, of the divine productive process.”¹⁵

According to our interpretation, Hegel's God is thus nothing other than the God who presents himself in religion, a spirit that produces itself and makes itself live. If we consider, for example, the Greek representation of the victory of the Olympic gods over the Titans¹⁶, on Hegel's view we cannot say that such a representation, in its existence and content, is a contingent construction. Rather, it is a self-determination of spirit. Certainly, this self-determination remains imperfect insofar as, *formally*, the Greek divine is embodied in myths and idols and, *through its content*, is linked to exterior conditions – in this case to the Titans. Such is the inadequacy of the Greek spirit in general, which does not yet enter into rapport with itself subjectively but remains relative to exterior conditions. Nevertheless, Greek

¹⁰ See: VPR I, 230. LPR I, 328: “Here we are considering, not God in general, but God in his representation. God appears, then, but he does not merely appear in general – he is essentially this, to appear to himself”.

¹¹ E III, § 383, TWA 10, 27, PM 17. See: Michael Theunissen, *Hegels Lehre vom absoluten Geist als theologisch-politischer Traktat*. Berlin 1970. 61ff.

¹² See: VPR I, 32. LPR I, 114-115.

¹³ See: VPR I, 158. LPR I, 249.

¹⁴ See: BDG, TWA 17, 390. LPEG, 73.

¹⁵ See: VPR I, 46. LPR I, 130.

¹⁶ See: VPR II, 365. LPR II, 464-465.

myth allows us to see a free self-affirmation of spirit when faced with the given manifold (a part here played by the Titans): in this way, we see the triumph of liberty as self-mediation over the immediacy of contingency. The myth in question is divine in the sense that it represents and, *eo ipso*, brings about the rising up of the Greek spirit over its subjective and primitive objective conditions.

Similarly, if we consider the life of the Christian community after the first Pentecost, Hegel argues that we are dealing with God himself, concretely incarnate in the Church. God is the soul – the shared knowledge and will – of the believing community, though a soul which produces itself as sovereign in opposition to particular individuals. In this respect, the spirit of the community is truly divine.¹⁷ It should be noted that, if God is immanent to the community, he cannot be confused with it since he directs it and, more precisely, leads it to overcome its primary 'naturalness' (or in theological terms: its sin). Here again, God is at once distinct from the finite spirit, and nevertheless is entirely embodied in the world of actual experience.

As can be seen, God for Hegel is not defined by his power over the world, but by his activity of self-representation. The greatness of God does not consist in *really* acting in nature or history, (because nature and history progress autonomously) but in becoming manifest *ideally* in religious beliefs. For Hegel, if knowledge is well-founded then it ranks higher than exterior *being*. More precisely, God represents himself at times through pure thought (the 'metaphysical concept' of God which, as shall be seen, includes proofs of his existence), at times by means of separate individuals (idols, Christ etc.), and at times as existing in the believing community (cultus). It is in this sense that the divine exists: not as a hundred existing thalers, that is, as a given sensible substance, but as an active subject gifted in knowledge and will, which incarnates itself in objectivity. At this point the hypothesis previously defended re-emerges: from the Hegelian point of view, to negate the existence of the divine would be rather strange, since the religious spirit is given in experience, and given with its meaning – that of the spirit which reconciles itself with the world.

What, however, is the particularly Hegelian meaning of the notion of God's existence? As we know, Hegel makes use of the classical expression *Dasein Gottes*. As for other Hegelian notions, the *Dasein* may be understood at times in a strict sense, as relating to the systematic order of the *Science of Logic* – where it occurs as the category of the intermediary “quality” between “pure being” and “being for itself” – but at other times in a broader sense, where it figures as “reality” in opposition to “thought”. Hegel notes that the former sense, which ties to a form of immediate and thus defective reality, is improper¹⁸ Moreover and correspondingly, given a dialectical frame, the *Dasein* as an object may only be defined by its opposition to God as subject – an opposition, then, whose sublation will be assured by the latter himself. Consequently, we have on one hand the divine spirit blessed with knowledge and will, and on the other hand we have the *Dasein* as the given reality in which the divine spirit is incarnate. For example, we might say that in the Christian religion, the *Dasein* of Christ is a particular body (the moment of concrete finitude) and that the *Dasein* of the Holy Spirit is the human community (the moment of concrete totality). More generally, the entire history of religion may be read with regard to these “*Dasein*”. In the Oriental religion, God, deprived of individuality and subjectivity, is objectified principally in a natural and contingent *Dasein*: for example, says Hegel, in animals (the Egyptian religion), light (the Persian religion), and so on. However, in the Greek religion, God, who is individualised but still deprived of subjectivity, is most often incarnate in an idealised human body which knows nothing of suffering or death. As we may note, *Dasein* here has less to do with the fact of being, and relates more to the given reality of which God takes charge and in which he realises himself.

However, it will not be sufficient to say that the religious spirit is a *sui generis* moment of the spirit. The spirit of the religious divine is not a peaceful plenitude, no more than any other moment of the Idea. The gods, in the exposé put forward in the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, are constantly confronted by their own limitations, by misfortunes, and by suffering and death. A study of the different categories of misfortunes to which the gods are subjected would fall beyond the scope of this article, but it is clear that the evolution of the religions, and the final movement from religion to philosophy, are linked to the inadequacy of the gods, which is painfully real to them. For example, the Oriental divine takes the form of perishable men or animals, the Greek gods are dominated by destiny, and the God of the Christian religion, as we know, must endure the Passion. The history of religions, which is a theogony, is then interpreted as the passing from one kind of existence to another. God exists, certainly, but his existence is nothing simple, since it is always the provisional result of a perpetually unsatisfying process. For

¹⁷ See: VPR III, 252. LPR III, 329.

¹⁸ See: VPR I, 310. LPR I, 417.

Hegel, the divine is saturated with negativity, and its existence may only be conquered when taken in opposition to a deficient preceding existence. For Hegel the existence of God is not something already established, but rather something being established. It is a constantly evolving existence which, insofar as it moves towards its foundations, constitutes a self-demonstration.

At this point, if we admit that the very life of God is itself the real demonstration here is, then what is the sense of the reflective proof of his existence? Can we consider that, *qua* moment of religion, it participates – however abstractly – in the divinisation of the spirit?

III. From the Cosmological Argument to the Ontological Argument

What, for Hegel, is the significance of the traditional proofs of God's existence? In the introduction we raised the question of the place these proofs take in the system. Do they fall within the domain of logic, of religion or of philosophy? ¹⁹ Regarding the first hypothesis, it is certain that logic, in the “Idea of Knowledge”, includes a thought of the proof in general, and that one might think of the logical Idea as divine within its own genre. Analogously, one could also conceive the development of the logical Idea, through which it conquers its objectivity and its interior mediation, as a vast ontological proof. Still, strictly speaking the proofs of God's existence always appear in Hegel as thought out by a historically situated spirit, which essentially invalidates this first interpretation. The second and third hypotheses, however, both seem to smack of promise, since the question of the proofs is considered just as much in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*²⁰ as in the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*. Do the proofs belong to religious representation or to philosophical understanding? There is certainly some hesitation here on Hegel's part²¹ – moreover, a hesitation which is rather habitual, since numerous similar cases may be noted in the system, notably at the junction of history, art and religion. If we define philosophy in terms of the speculative form, *viz.* in terms of the systematic unity of moments, then the proofs such as they are presented historically are rejected to the religious camp. But against such a conclusion one would object that the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, as well as the preliminary Concept of the first part of the *Encyclopaedia*, show that philosophy is far from always being speculative. From another angle, if we define religion in terms of sensible representation, then the proofs, being perfectly abstract, will be rejected to the philosophical camp. But one would object this time that the first part of the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* shows that religion includes some moments of pure thinking.²²

Let us suggest another possibility. According to Hegel, religion is characterised by an insoluble duality between the believing subject and the divine object, while philosophy produces a complete reconciliation between the thinking subject and the object being thought through. The discourse of the proofs maintains this duality, since the existence of God is taken as apprehended by a finite spirit. Such is doubtless the reason for which Hegel, in the introduction of the *Lecture* of 1827, sets the “thought of religion”, as a moment of philosophy, in opposition to “religious thought”, as a moment of religion, the latter including the proofs of the existence of God.²³ Furthermore, the introduction to the *Lecture* of 1824 distinguishes, as mentioned earlier, three points in any determinate religion: “proofs”, “representation” – i.e. the concrete representation of the gods – and “cultus”.²⁴ The ensemble of the proofs is thus quite clearly a moment of religion. Moreover, the *Lectures* on religion of 1821 and 1824 contain very lengthy expositions of them. In short, the proofs fall under the category of religion, at least according to the texts mentioned, which signifies both that the divine reveals itself in them, and that they are irredeemably inadequate, since they do not proceed from self-thought but from dualistic thought.

Furthermore, we may note that for Hegel each class of religion has its own specific kind of proof. The cosmological argument relates to the religions of nature – essentially Buddhism, Hinduism and Zoroastrianism; the physico-theological proof belongs to the religions of determinate individuality – Judaism, the Greek religion and the Roman religion; and the ontological argument belongs to the accomplished religion, i.e. to Christianity. We may make two preliminary remarks here on the link with Kant. On the one hand, Hegel is clearly indebted to Kantianism since he adopts the series proposed in

¹⁹ On this question, see *W. Jaeschke: Hegel Handbuch: Leben - Werk - Schule*, Stuttgart – Weimar 2003. 498.

²⁰ See: for example the chapters on Anselm (in particular *TWA* 19, 555-560), Descartes (*TWA* 20, 137-144) and Kant (*TWA* 20, 358-362).

²¹ According to Walter Jaeschke, the proofs have not the same nature in the LPR and in the LPEG (see *die Religionsphilosophie Hegels*, Darmstadt 1983. 500).

²² See: in particular the section on « the Knowledge of God » in the *Lecture* of 1827.

²³ See: *VPR* I, 87. *LPR* I, 179.

²⁴ See: *VPR* I, 55-58. *LPR* I, 141-145.

the Transcendental Dialectic of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Furthermore, he follows Kant in making the ontological argument the highest proof, that which constitutes the “truth” of the two others. However on the other hand, in contrast to Kant, he does not take the physico-theological proof to be the first and foremost proof, opting instead for the cosmological argument. And he does not consider these proofs to be matters of anhistoric pure reason, holding rather that they belong to religion in its historical progress – even if it is true that, in the *Lectures* of 1829, he examines them *sub specie aeterni*.

It will be of interest, then, to observe the logic of the transition from one proof to another. a) According to Hegel, the traditional cosmological argument says: “Since the world is contingent, there must exist some absolutely necessary essence”.²⁵ This discourse consists in an *immediate* process since there is a passing from one term to its opposite without a link between them. From a Hegelian perspective, the cosmological argument only notes the overturning of one category into its contrary. Moreover, it admits of all sorts of variations following the same model: the finite exists therefore so does the infinite, the many exist therefore so does the One, etc. More precisely, as in any immediate process, this overturning ties simply to the poverty of the categories in question. Abstract thought of the contingent cannot subsist *as such* and leaves its place to (equally abstract) thought of necessity. There is no interior mediation that crops up in both categories, but simply the disappearance of contingency and the correlating arise of necessity.²⁶ b) The physico-theological proof suggests that: “Things show themselves to be ends and also means for each other. That they are means to ends is not posited by the things themselves. [...] There consequently exists a wise cause which, as freedom and intelligence, is the cause of the world”.²⁷ The second proof consists in a reflective process, since there is an exterior transition from one term to the other, and insofar as they mirror one another reciprocally, the wisdom of the one being the cause of the finalised order of the other. c) Finally, the traditional ontological argument, according to Hegel's exposition, suggests that “the concept, which is self-contained infinitude, resolves itself into being, and that being is conceived from the concept”.²⁸ This third proof is a speculative transition in that the two terms belong to one another, and more specifically, that God as *subject* gives himself his own *objective reality*.²⁹

What commentary does Hegel make regarding the first two proofs? Here a difficulty arises, in that for each case he juxtaposes two types of critique, which are linked on the one hand to the inadequate form of these proofs, and on the other to their insufficient content. First, he reproaches them for not integrating the idea of negativity, and consequently for considering the different moments as purely and simply depending on one another.³⁰ If the “necessary” God, for example, is dependent upon of the “contingent” world, then God is not truly necessary.³¹ In the same way, if the representation of God as organising the world is dependent upon us, then God is not truly objective.³² Still, this criticism is not a fatal blow, since it authorises a reformulation which would itself be adequate. His second point, however, is that the weakness of the first two proofs is irremediable since it stems from their inability to conceive of God as a free subject. Even if God is defined *negatively*, by opposition to the contingency of things or to the order of organic nature, there still remains a formal being or a finite power: “If these propositions have for their predicate such terms as substance of the world, its necessary essence, cause which regulates and directs it according to design, they are certainly inadequate to express what is or ought to be understood by God.”³³ On the one hand, the cosmological Argument considers a God who is indifferent to the world and to himself. On the other hand, the physico-theological proof considers a God who is not defined in himself but solely in his relation to the natural world, and whose goals have the limited character of

²⁵ *BDG TWA* 17, 461. *LPEG*, 129.

²⁶ See: *BDG TWA* 17, 464. *LPEG*, 114: “Not because the contingent is, but rather because it is non-being, only appearance, because its being is not genuine actuality – it is because of this that absolute necessity is.” See: *Vittorio Hösle: Hegels System* 1988. 1, 192.

²⁷ *VPR* II, 315-316. *LPR* II, 415-416.

²⁸ *VPR* III, 112. *LPR* III, 177.

²⁹ Hegelianism is a circle of circles. Consequently, we can assert without contradiction that the Ontological Argument is the *speculative* moment, i.e. internally mediated, of a discourse which belongs to religion, and thus which, as separating the subject and the object of representation, is fundamentally *reflective*. We could refine this analysis in adding that, in the cycle of religion and in opposition to the concrete representation and to the cultus, the entirely dis-incarnate moment of proofs is *immediate*, etc.

³⁰ See: *E I*, § 50 Anmerkung, *TWA* 8, 132. *L* 103-104. The thirteenth lecture on the proofs of the existence of God quotes Jacobi's *Briefe* (*Werke*, Leipzig, 1812-25, 4-2. 149): “To comprehend the unconditioned means to make it into something conditioned or an effect.” See: *Guy Planty-Bonjour: Le projet hégélien*. Paris 1993. 152.

³¹ See: *VPR* II, 301. *LPR* II, 401: “Absolute necessity is thus made dependent, in such a way that contingent things remain outside it.” See: H. Knudsen: *Gottesbeweise im deutschen Idealismus*. Berlin 1971. 180ff.

³² See: *VPR* II, 606. *LPR* II, 718: “God's determinate being is represented in this argument merely as a postulate, an “ought”, which should have subjective certainty for human beings.”

³³ *E I*, § 50 Anm., *TWA* 8, 134, *L I*, 106.

natural goals. Here we return to the idea that the cosmological and teleological Arguments still present an incomplete divine, that of the non-Christian religions. Only the third proof, says Hegel, carries an adequate idea of the divine. Indeed, in this proof he sees “a sign that subjectivity has attained its being-for-self and has arrived at totality”³⁴. For him, the Ontological Argument belongs specifically to the modern world – modern, not in that it follows the Middle Ages, but in that it is Christian³⁵: “This then is the grandeur of this standpoint, the standpoint of the modern world: that the subject has so sunk itself within itself that the [...] in this infinitude it is afflicted with finitude, is afflicted with this antithesis that it is driven to resolve.”³⁶

More generally, what is the validity of the project of the proofs of God's existence itself? Here we note a complete ambivalence on Hegel's part. On the one hand, he does not expressly condemn the proofs since according to him they ensure the elevation of the human spirit to God.³⁷ Moreover, he complains of the discredit into which they have fallen to the benefit of sole faith – for which, in his view, Jacobi and Schleiermacher are notably responsible. On the other hand, he comments on the discourse of the proofs in an essentially critical manner, and persistently opposes them to speculative philosophy. In fact, Hegel's attitude towards the proofs seems to resonate with his general attitude towards the discourse of understanding. For him, there is a respect in which such a discourse is true, in that it is spiritual, and consequently self-determining. In another respect however, it remains divided between the knowing subject and the object known. This division appears notably in the plurality of the proofs and in the fact that any one of them can be considered both valid and invalid at the same time. The proofs are true and untrue in contradiction, which is indicative of their limited validity. Moreover, in the development of religion they are merely a beginning, since they remain below any incarnation in a concrete figure or any development within a community practising its cultus. This deficiency is summarised by the expression of the “metaphysical concept”³⁸, which denounces both their abstraction and their lack of autonomous life.

A. Formulations of the Ontological Argument

However, let us examine the Ontological Argument, considered principally in the third part of the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, in a little more depth. Here, Hegel is confronted with two interlocutors: St. Anselm of Canterbury, and Kant. He considers both to be correct in some respects and mistaken in others, and accordingly provides his own formulation of what would count as a truly speculative ontological argument.

a) Hegel summarises Anselm's analysis as follows: “God is the conceptual sum (*Inbegriff*) of all forms of reality; consequently he also includes being. [...] [But] being is so poor a determination that it belongs immediately to the concept. [...] Anselm presupposes perfection, which in itself is still indeterminate”.³⁹ What does this analysis mean (given that we shall not be concerned here to evaluate its historical pertinence)? First, let us recall several implicit points which follow from the situation of the process in the final, and thus “concretely subjective” moment of the proofs of God's existence. 1) In Hegel's view, as has been noted, Anselm, as a Christian thinker, understands God as a *subject* and thus as imprinting *himself* upon a particular object, making it *his own*. In the cited text, the notion of “concept” ties back to the divine subject, blessed with knowledge and will, while the notion of “being” – or of “*Dasein*” or existence – relates to the given object. 2) The relationship of the concept to the being is not that of a *real* creation but that of an *ideal* undertaking, that is, of theoretical knowledge or of practical determination. The being is always already there, but it is the concept that gives it its true meaning. 3) The process described, then, is as follows: the concept, in knowing and acting, suppresses its initial purity and, taking charge of the presupposed being, acquires an objectivity itself – the question, as we shall see, is just what kind of objectivity. It is in this way that the divine subject becomes incarnate in the being, in the given existence, and is thus able to make itself exist concretely. The perfection here considered consists precisely in the ideal integration of the being (existence) by the concept (the divine subject).

Secondly, however, the text cited insists strikingly upon the insufficiency of Anselm's proof – which is described only as a “presupposition” – and, correlatively, upon the deceptive character of the God under

³⁴ VPR III, 111. LPR III, 176.

³⁵ See: VPR III, 112. LPR III, 177.

³⁶ VPR III, 112. LPR III, 177.

³⁷ See: for instance BDG TWA 17, 356. LPEG, 45.

³⁸ See: for instance VPR III, 108. LPR III, 173.

³⁹ VPR III, 115-118. LPR III, 180-183.

consideration, whose perfection is merely “indeterminate”, imprinted upon a “poor” being. Furthermore, the simple fact that this proof is overshadowed by the Kantian critique is testament to its weakness. Why can we not stop at the Anselmian version of the ontological argument? In reality, Hegel says, Anselm only draws out the *first* moment of the ontological argument, that of presupposition, of immediacy. The fact that the Anselmian argument is only the beginning – the immediacy – of the ontological proof implies that, according to Anselm (or rather: according to Hegel's Anselm), God's taking charge of the *Dasein* is merely an *assumed* process. Even if God, *qua* subject, actively makes himself exist, he is still not required to fight against any preceding separation here between himself and the being, but simply to integrate a being which is always already found within him. God's taking charge of the being does not constitute a negation of negation, but simply a peaceful interior development. God does not make himself exist other than in virtue of what he is, he presupposes himself. This is why his objectivity is formal, in the sense that he only exists inside himself. The existence of God is assumed but not firmly established, that is, in opposition to challenges against his existence.

The question, then, is this: what gives Anselm the right to “presuppose” this perfection of God? We should say that, from a Hegelian perspective, any systematic process begins by definition with a moment of immediacy: any thought “has an initial or immediate point – for it must begin somewhere – a point which is not demonstrated (*ein nicht Erwiesenes*) and is not a result”.⁴⁰ Anselm's discourse, which is not yet an *actual* (*wirklich*) proof, is authorised by its position at the commencement of the cycle of the ontological proof. That said, Anselm's God pays for his presupposition with the abstraction, with the “poverty” of his *Dasein*. This *Dasein* can only be interior, which is to say, closed upon itself, and such that it remains indifferent to exterior existence. One might here think of the first part of the Doctrine of the Concept in the *Science of Logic*, i.e. of unilateral subjectivity.⁴¹ This last is certainly realised in a particularity, and consequently in an existence: however, this particularly belongs not to exterior objectivity, but only to the sphere of the subject, which is by definition undeveloped and therefore indeterminate. By way of analogy, we might also think of the immanent Trinity as the first moment of the Christian religion according to the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*. In this moment God certainly exists, although he only exists *in himself* and not *in the world*, he is not incarnate but closed upon himself. Such is the limitation of Anselm's God. The author of the *Prosligion* is right to say that God, as a subject, possesses a *Dasein* – but his God remains one-sided: “The [...] point about Anselm's way of [abstracting] the concept is that its presupposition is in fact the unity of concept and reality. This is why the proof cannot afford satisfaction for reason, since the presupposition is precisely what is at issue”.⁴²

b) Let us now move onto the second, Kantian formulation of the proof (here again, we will not concern ourselves with the philological acceptability of the Hegelian interpretation). Hegel summarises the Kantian critique of the ontological argument in the *Critique of Pure Reason* as follows: “On the one hand we have the concept of God – but that we cannot “pluck” (*herauskleben*) being from this concept, for being is something other than the concept. The two are distinguished and opposed to each other; therefore the concept cannot contain being”.⁴³ In Hegel's view, Kant, however much he stands in contrast to Anselm, is just as correct as him, for the subject does indeed separate itself from the object in its development. Hegel understands the Kantian approach, which he interprets as a proof of the non-existence of God in the sense of his inability to realise himself in existence, essentially rooted in the dichotomy of subject and object, which is in his view the leitmotiv of critical thought. For Hegel, Kantian discourse can be linked with the second moment of the Doctrine of the concept, that of unilateral objectivity, when the concept is powerless in relation to being, either unable to adequately represent it, or unable to direct it effectively: “We know quite well, of course, that one can build castles in the air (*Luftschlösser*), but that this does not bring them into existence”.⁴⁴ For Hegel, the Kantian analysis expresses an empiricist point of view. For him this point of view is indeed pertinent in certain respects, but refers only to a finite reality. Thus it cannot be the final moment of the enquiry into the absolute: “Those who perpetually urge against the philosophic Idea the difference between Being and Thought, might have admitted that philosophers were not wholly ignorant of the fact. Can there be any

⁴⁰ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, § 2 Z., TWA 7, 30, edited by Allan Wood, translated by Hugh Barr Nisbet, Cambridge 1991. 26.

⁴¹ See: E I, § 193 Anm., TWA 8, 348. L I, 329-333, which refers to Anselm's Argument.

⁴² VPR III, 117. LPR III, 182.

⁴³ VPR III, 113-114. LPR III, 178.

⁴⁴ VPR III, 114. LPR III, 179.

proposition more trite than this?”⁴⁵ This perspective could not be the highest since, for Hegel, the finite inevitably perishes and does not present any resistance to its sublation by the infinite. In other words, there are certainly cases where thought can neither know being nor direct it appropriately: but this simply shows that the thought and being in question are both defective. Kant's God keeps his distance from objective reality, which discredits both the God in question for his lack of power, and objective reality for its absence of rationality.

c) In Hegel's view, just as for Anselm the presupposition of the immediate unity of concept and being was valid but abstract and only provisional, for Kant the presupposition of the separation of concept from being is pertinent but unilateral. It thus cannot be the final word of the ontological proof. Indeed, what neither Anselm nor Kant sees is that there is also a third moment where the divine subject sublates objective reality. Neither the immediate identity of the concept and the being nor their separation is immutable. As Hegel persistently shows, thought is as capable of liberating itself from its interior retreat as from its powerlessness regarding exterior objectivity, and thus is able to affirm its freedom from the centre of that which, to it, is most contrary. So then, by way of a truly Hegelian formulation of the ontological argument, we have the recognition of an activity of the subject which goes beyond any unilaterality:

That the concept sublates its one-sidedness, that it determines itself implicitly, objectifies itself, realizes itself, this is a further insight which [needs] first to have emerged from the nature of the concept. This insight, which is not present – and could not occur – in Anselm or even in later times, is an insight into the extent to which the concept itself sublates its one-sidedness. This is one of the most important points.⁴⁶

The concept does not only have being within itself implicitly [...]. It sublates its subjectivity itself and objectifies itself. [...] The concept is always this positing of being as identical with itself. [...] What the concept does is to sublata its differentiation. When we look closely at the nature of the concept, we see that its identity with being is no longer a presupposition but the result. What happens is that the concept objectifies itself, makes itself reality and thus becomes the truth, the unity of subject and object.⁴⁷

This analysis is at once both ambitious and modest – much like Hegel's idealism as a whole. It is ambitious in that it posits that no reality can resist the influence of thought. But it is modest in considering that reality, as such, is only beaten in an ideal respect. The God being sketched here is merely a thinking subject: but his greatness consists precisely in this. God is not preoccupied with constituting any sort of formal necessity that would be substituted for the contingency of things (as in the cosmological proof), nor some objective power that would “really” govern the world (as in the physico-theological proof), but is concerned with thinking out the real and directing it by ideal laws. As was mentioned earlier, in Hegel's view nothing is higher than thought, with the result that the God of the ontological proof takes, at the centre of the systematic cycle of proofs, a supreme rank. The significance of the proof, then, is that it allows us to witness the self-foundation of God as a universal subjective instance: a God who is under no obligation to produce himself as such, but who is not unwilling to do so since he tends spontaneously towards the greatest freedom.

B. What does the Ontological Argument have to offer?

What is the weight of such a discourse? For Hegel, does this proof signify that the existence of God is invincibly established, and that we must simply admit it unless we plunge into incoherence? Or, on the contrary, is there not perhaps room to suspect that we are in the presence of an intellectual mechanism which, though well oiled, is running on empty? The question must be asked once more: what do the proofs prove, and particularly in their most satisfactory formulation?

As was said previously, the proofs of God's existence are not designed to respond to doubts nor to provide any kind of praise of religious belief. For the end of knowledge, according to Hegel, is immanent, it is self-constitution in free knowledge and not serving as a means for something other than itself.

⁴⁵ See: *E I*, § 51 Anm., *TWA* 8, 136. *L I*, 108.

⁴⁶ *VPR* III, 117. *LPR* III, 182.

⁴⁷ *VPR* III, 274-275. *LPR* III, 356. See: Dieter Henrich: *Der Ontologische Gottesbeweis: sein Problem und seine Geschichte in der Neuzeit*. Tübingen 1967. 216-218.

Correspondingly, knowledge is not true in virtue of the existence, exterior to it, of a reality which it faithfully expresses, but in virtue of the extent to which it is self-founded. In particular, the proofs according to Hegel do not envisage a God exterior to thought, but a God who is an object of thought.

As such, the question addressed by the proof is not: is there, outside of discourse, a God that discourse could reveal indubitably? But: is the God of the proof, in his own frame, adequately conceived? This last is an important issue indeed, for in Hegel's view religious discourse is not a *flatus vocis* – “a simple discourse” – but constitutes, like any form of knowledge or will, a constitutive activity of spirit. The question is therefore not of knowing whether the proofs are correct or incorrect, but whether they permit a total independence of the spirit that formulates them. And the answer is that, much like religious discourse on understanding, they only allow it a partial independence. Insofar as they do not possess the dignity of a speculative philosophical discourse, the proofs, however pertinent inasmuch as they proceed from the sovereign action of the spirit, remain unilateral, since they are dualistic and are not organised into a self-founded system. In other words, though this discourse eventually pushes us to witness to the living existence of God as auto-position in objectivity, it is not the discourse that God would take over himself. It is thus essentially reflective: certainly the ontological proof is true in its own way, but it relies on a subjective interest of the thinker, on an individual intellectual choice which is ultimately contingent. The discourse of the proof depends on the finite subject that utters it, with the result that its necessity remains relative. The proofs ensure a progression of the spirit towards its accomplishment, but this progression is limited.

Let us take another viewpoint. Can the discourse of the proofs, such as Hegel theorises and reformulates it, satisfy us? We would normally expect a proof of God's existence to show that the idea of the non-existence of God is devoid of any truth and, moreover, that it does not rely on any postulate whose truth is beyond doubt. As far as Hegel is concerned, these demands are absurd. a) First, the non-existence of God, as we have seen, is indeed perfectly conceivable, since the God of religion undergoes the experience of suffering and death, and he sublates his own deficient existence freely. And if we consider, more specifically, the God of the ontological proof, on the one hand he is under no obligation to sublimate the *Dasein*, and on the other hand, the understanding which brings out the proof is in no way obliged to go beyond the Anselmian or Kantian moments to reach the third formulation of the proof. There is no strict necessity in either the theme of investigation or in the reasoning undertaken by the knowing subject. For Hegel, the dialectic development is always free, since it relies upon the spontaneous action of the thing itself – here as a demonstrating subject or as a divine subject taken as the topic of the demonstration. Consequently, we should not expect a Hegelian proof to establish that we are forced to admit that God exists.

b) For the second point, the systematic process as understood by Hegel always rests upon a presupposition. This can be seen, for example, in the workings of the ontological proof, which takes precisely the Anselmian presupposition that God exists as a starting point. The beginning of a process is immediate by definition, that is, unfounded in itself. It is true of course, but only “for us” and not “in and for itself”. At the same time, this initial presupposition does not commit the whole process to a vicious circle since, after the second moment – the *finite* negation of the first –, the third moment is then the *infinite* negation of the first two. The proof does not lead from the same to the same but from an abstract presupposition (here, the Anselmian moment) and its abstract overturning (here, the Kantian critique) to a concrete auto-position (the Hegelian formulation of the proof). More generally, the mistake would be to believe that systematic Hegelian processes are entirely rational and self-determining. In fact, rather than completely rational through and through, they constitute an operation of rationalisation. Rationality is a result and not a starting point. Systematic process always proceeds from a given immediacy (the moment of the non-rational). However, in sublating it, it becomes the interior principles of that immediacy (the moment of the victory of the rational over the non-rational). In the proof of the existence of God, we thus move from an abstract God, closed upon himself, to a concrete God, who incarnates himself adequately in objectivity. The starting point is “sublated” but not “annihilated”, the presupposition is still the basis of the proof, though it is still entirely negated to the benefit of a self-determining term.

We might return briefly, then, to the Kant-Hegel debate – or at least to Hegel's view of it, which certainly merits discussion. The Kantian opposition between concept and existence, or between thought and reality, is too rudimentary for Hegel. He accepts the distinction, but refuses to stop there. First: because thought thinks up its own existence by definition (the Anselmian moment). Second: because thought can also realise itself into exterior being and affirm itself there (the speculative moment). A

Kantian might say: I would prefer to have a hundred thalers in my pocket than a hundred thalers in my mind alone. To this a Hegelian might reply: I myself would prefer, to a hundred thalers in my pocket, a well thought-out economic theory or a government providing economically effective politics. Kant, in his critique of the ontological proof, seems to make the given sensible object into the only type of existence which can present itself in experience. By contrast, a fundamental decision of Hegel's consists in recognising the presence of gifted subjects of knowledge and volition at the heart of the real. There is no escape from the boundaries of experience in this, only a thought of the freedom concretely embodied in experience.

Let us go further. According to the Kantian image of the hundred thalers, we want to say that it is the sensible real that constitutes the criterion permitting the judgement of the validity of a representation. From a Hegelian point of view, things are exactly opposite to this: for Hegel, the true is not that which corresponds to the exterior thing but that which is self-founded.⁴⁸ Paradoxically, this is what gives meaning and value to the proofs, even though they must be understood in relative terms. The proofs do not expect an existing or non-existing God to confirm or refute them, and must simply develop themselves in their own domain, that of the “metaphysical concept”. Certainly, this is no huge thing, but it is already an elevation towards the divine.

Hegel holds no contempt for the proofs of the existence of God – just as he holds none for critiques made of them. Certainly, in his view, these proofs are nothing more than a religious thought, to the effect that they express an inescapable division between the believing subject and the object of belief. Further still, they only represent the first moment of religion: it is for this reason that they are abstract (in contrast to genuine religious representations) and do not allow the believing subject to sanctify himself practically (in contrast to the cultus). Nonetheless, they are true in the sense that they develop themselves on the basis of an interior reason – namely, the spirit – which they manifest adequately. The proofs are valid in their own way, although their critiques are equally pertinent – and this contradiction is one of the traits proper to the religious sphere.

The proofs of the existence of God do not claim to instruct us. They are not addressed to an audience that needs convincing, constituting instead a process of reasoning that the demonstrating spirit undertakes for itself. And this not for the sake of knowing whether, by chance, God exists outside of thought and the world of experience, but to think better. Furthermore, in Hegel's view, man, inevitably a member of a people and a religion, always already has the conviction that God exists – and, more precisely, in the Christian era, he thinks of him as a subject which realises itself in the Dasein. Just as in order to philosophise, it is necessary to throw oneself into philosophy, so in order to examine the existence of God one must already admit that he exists. The proof consists, then, in conceiving of the process of the divine as the act by which the *presupposed* God makes himself concrete, effective, bringing about the sublation of the *presupposed* reality. Nothing is truly discovered or learned in such a proof. Nevertheless, a genuinely new form of the spirit is conceived, and by this a new freedom is won.

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⁴⁸ See: *E I*, § 172 Zusatz, *TWA* 8, 323, *L I*. 305.